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THE PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS ON THE DEPRIVATION OF FREEDOMS TO 
PREVENT THE SPREADING OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES
А. Волок. Практика Европейского суда по правам человека отно-
сительно ограничения свобод лиц с целью предотвращения рас-
пространения инфекционных заболеваний. – статья.
в статье анализируется практика европейского суда по правам че­
ловека относительно нарушений государствами подпараграфа (е) па­
раграфа 1 статьи 5 европейской конвенции о защите прав человека 
и основных свобод о «заключении под стражу лиц с целью предот­
вращения распространения инфекционных заболеваний, а также за­
конное заключение под стражу душевнобольных, алкоголиков, нар­
команов или бродяг». подчеркивается, что судом было рассмотрено 
ограниченное количество дел по приведенному положению конвен­
ции, а в отношении неправомерного «заключения под стражу лиц 
с целью предотвращения распространения инфекционных заболева­
ний» была подана всего одна жалоба за всю историю существования 
еспч, дело по рассмотрению которой, таким образом, представляет 
особый интерес и анализируется в статье.
Ключевые слова: европейская конвенция о защите прав человека и 
основных свобод, европейский суд по правам человека, право на 
свободу и личную неприкосновенность, распространение инфекци­
онных заболеваний, заключение по стражу душевнобольных, алко­
голиков, наркоманов или бродяг.
О. Волок. Практика Європейського суду з прав людини щодо об-
меження свобод осіб з метою запобігання поширенню інфекцій-
них захворювань. – стаття.
у статті аналізується практика Європейського суду з прав людини 
щодо порушень державами абзацу (е) параграфа 1 статті 5 Європей­
ської конвенції про захист прав людини і основоположних свобод 
про «затримання осіб для запобігання поширенню інфекційних за­
хворювань, законне затримання психічнохворих, алкоголіків або 
наркоманів чи бродяг». підкреслюється, що судом було розгляну­
то обмежену кількість справ за наведеним положенням конвенції, а 
щодо неправомірного взяття «під варту осіб з метою запобігання по­
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ширенню інфекційних захворювань» було подано всього одну скар­
гу за всю історію існування Єспл, справа з розгляду якій, таким 
чином, представляє інтерес та аналізується в статті.
Ключові слова: Європейська конвенція про захист прав людини і 
основоположних свобод, Європейський суд з прав людини, право на 
свободу та особисту недоторканність, поширення інфекційних за­
хворювань, затримання психічнохворих, алкоголіків, наркоманів чи 
бродяг.
A. Voloc. The practice of the European Court of Human rights on 
the deprivation of freedoms to prevent the spreading of infectious dis-
eases. – аrticle.
The article examines the practice of the European Court of human Rights 
regarding the violations of subparagraph (e) of paragraph 1 of Article 5 of 
the European Convention for the Protection of human Rights and funda­
mental freedoms, «detention of persons for the prevention of the spread­
ing of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug 
addicts or vagrants.» It is emphasized that the Court has considered a 
limited number of cases on the given provision of the Convention, and in 
respect of unlawful «detention of persons for the prevention of the spread­
ing of infectious diseases» only one application was filed throughout the 
history of the EChR, the case considering it therefore being of a particular 
interest is analyzed in this article.
Keywords: European Convention for the Protection of human Rights and 
fundamental freedoms, the European Court of human Rights, the right 
to liberty and security of a person, spreading of infectious diseases, the 
detention of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or va­
grants.
The case­law of the European Court of human Rights on the right 
to liberty and security (Article 5 of the Convention for the Protection 
of human Rights and fundamental freedoms) is highly extensive and 
has been examined by a great number of domestic and foreign scholars. 
however, the practice of the Court on the (e) subparagraph of the first 
paragraph of Article 5, namely «[Everyone has the right to liberty and 
security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the 
following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:] 
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading 
of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug 
addicts, or vagrants» has been lacking academic attention [1]. As R. 
Martin writes, «little judicial attention has addressed the exercise 
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of public health powers. Indeed, the role of law in public health has 
been much neglected at both judicial and academic level» [2]. While 
the mental aspect of compulsory confinement has been addressed by 
the Court in 70 cases, the lawfulness of detention to prevent spreading 
infectious diseases has been considered by the Court in one case, Enhorn 
v. Sweden (2005) throughout the whole history of the Court’s existence. 
The EChR itself recognized that «the Court has only to a very limited 
extent decided cases where a person has been detained for the prevention 
of spreading infectious diseases» [3].
The case of Enhorn v. Sweden has therefore become of high 
importance as the case demonstrating the position of the Court regarding 
the conditions of lawful application of restriction of rights to prevent 
spreading infectious disease. In the case, the applicant was an hIV 
positive man who based on his hIV status had been kept in confinement 
for long stretches of time by Swedish authorities. Swedish courts had 
determined that he was unable to comply with measures prescribed to 
him aimed at preventing him from spreading the hIV infection and 
had ordered confinement under the Swedish Infectious Diseases Act. 
In total, the order to deprive him of his liberty was in force for seven 
years, while the time he spent in isolation amounted to one year and a 
half. The applicant claimed that the decision to deprive him of his liberty 
went contrary to his right to liberty and security under Article 5 of the 
Convention [4].
In the Judgment, the Court established that since there is a lack of 
relevant case law, «it is therefore called upon to establish which criteria are 
relevant when assessing whether such a detention is in compliance with 
the principle of proportionality and the requirement that any detention 
must be free from arbitrariness». By way of comparison, for the purposes 
of Article 5 § 1 (e), the EChR confirmed its approach, that individual 
cannot be deprived of his liberty as being of unsound mind unless the 
following three minimum conditions are satisfied: firstly, he must reliably 
be shown to be of unsound mind; secondly, the mental disorder must be 
of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement; and thirdly, the 
validity of continued confinement depends upon the persistence of such 
a disorder (see Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, judgment of 24 October 
1979, Series A no. 33, pp. 17­18, § 39) [5].
In Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, the Court decided that the issue 
of what is «lawfulness» of the detention for the purposes of Article 5 
para. 1 (e) had to be determined. The Court said: «Such «lawfulness» 
408
presupposes conformity with the domestic law in the first place and 
also, as confirmed by Article 18 (art. 18), conformity with the purpose 
of the restrictions permitted by Article 5 para. 1 (e); it is required in 
respect of both the ordering and the execution of the measures involving 
deprivation of liberty… As regards the conformity with the domestic 
law, the Court points out that the term «lawful» covers procedural as 
well as substantive rules. There thus exists a certain overlapping between 
this term and the general requirement stated at the beginning of Article 
5 para. 1, namely observance of «a procedure prescribed by law». The 
Court highlighted, that «these two expressions reflect the importance of 
the aim underlying Article 5 para. 1: in a democratic society subscribing 
to the rule of law, no detention that is arbitrary can ever be regarded as 
«lawful». Referring to the Commission’s position, the Court decides that 
«no one may be confined as «a person of unsound mind» in the absence 
of medical evidence establishing that his mental state is such as to justify 
his compulsory hospitalisation». hence, the Court «fully agrees with 
this line of reasoning. In the Court’s opinion, except in emergency cases, 
the individual concerned should not be deprived of his liberty unless he 
has been reliably shown to be of «unsound mind». The very nature of 
what has to be established before the competent national authority – that 
is, a true mental disorder – calls for objective medical expertise. further, 
the mental disorder must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory 
confinement. What is more, the validity of continued confinement 
depends upon the persistence of such a disorder [6].
The Court confirmed its approach in Luberti v. Italy (1984), 
where the applicant was convicted of murder and then appealed on the 
grounds that he was insane at the time of the commission of the killing. 
The appeal court ordered a psychiatric opinion from two experts who 
concluded that the applicant had a mental illness which deprived him of 
the capacity to form an intention and that at the time when the opinion 
was made he was, in psychiatric terms, a dangerous person. A third 
expert was asked to provide an opinion. This expert confirmed that 
the psychosis had certainly also existed at the time of the killing. The 
appeal court acquitted the applicant on the ground of mental disorder 
and directed that he should be detained for years in the psychiatric 
hospital of Aversa. During this detention, the applicant applied three 
times to be discharged. he argued a violation of the Article 5, stating 
that at the time the appeal court gave its judgment he was no longer 
suffering from a mental disorder. he maintained that the appeal court 
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had ordered his detention without having regard to his state of health on 
the date of judgment.
The Court decided that «to comply with Article 5 § 1, the 
confinement in question must have been effected in accordance with 
a procedure prescribed by law, have been lawful and have involved a 
person of unsound mind. It was only the last test which was, according to 
the applicant, not satisfied; there was no dispute as regards the other two 
The Court would recall that in deciding whether an individual should be 
detained as a person of unsound mind, the national authorities are to be 
recognized as having a certain margin of appreciation since it is in the 
first place for the national authorities to evaluate the evidence adduced 
before them in a particular case; the Courts task is to review under the 
Convention the decisions of those authorities. An individual cannot be 
considered to be of unsound mind for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 and 
deprived of his liberty unless the following three minimum conditions 
are satisfied: he must be reliably shown to be of unsound mind; the 
mental disorder must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory 
confinement; and the validity of continued confinement depends upon 
the persistence of such a disorder. The Court, therefore, established, that 
on the basis of the evidence before it, it does not consider that it has been 
established that the applicants detention continued beyond the period 
justified by his mental disorder. There has therefore been no violation of 
Article 5 § 1 [7].
In Herczegfalvy v. Austria (1992), the European Court upheld the 
long­term use of physical restraints where such practice is determined 
to constitute «medical necessity.» Rosenthal called on the Special 
Rapporteur to repudiate the doctrine of medical necessity [8]. In 1976, 
when the applicant was serving a prison sentence, further criminal 
proceedings were brought against him for assaults on prison officers 
and other detainees and serious threats against judges. On completion 
of the original sentence on May 1977 he remained in prison and from 
January 1978 was detained in an institution for mentally ill offenders, 
for part of the time on the basis of pre­trial detention, and for part of the 
time as detention following a final judgment. he remained there until his 
conditional release on 28 November 1984. According to the Court, none 
of the periods of detention in issue, which had come under paragraph 1 
(c) of Article 5 of the time and paragraph 1 (e) for the remaining time, 
had violated those provisions; the decisions of the relevant authorities 
had complied with the national law and had not been arbitrarily. The 
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Court stated, that «in order to justify detention, the fact that a person is 
«of unsound mind» must be established conclusively, except in case of 
emergency. To this end an objective medical report must demonstrate 
to the competent national authority the existence of a genuine mental 
disturbance whose nature or extent is such as to justify such deprivation 
of liberty, which cannot be extended unless the mental disturbance 
continues» [9]. however, the Court decided that there had therefore been 
a violation of Article 5, para 4 [10]. 
The Court examined the essential (practical) aspect of the lawful 
detention in Aerts v. Belgium (1998), where the applicant, who was 
charged with an assault causing its victim to be certified unfit for work, 
having attacked his ex­wife with a hammer. Later in the court he was 
assessed to be mentally ill. The applicant was detained for medical 
therapy in the psychiatric wing of a prison. he, therefore, complained that 
the prison was not an appropriate facility for a person with mental illness 
and that he did not receive regular medical attention. The Court decided 
that «there had been a breach of section 14 of the Social Protection Act of 
1 July 1964, which provided for the detention of a mentally ill person in a 
prison as a provisional measure only, pending designation by the relevant 
mental health board of the institution where he was to be detained. his 
continued detention on remand had therefore no longer had any legal 
basis». It furthermore established that «there must be some relationship 
between the ground of permitted deprivation of liberty relied on and 
the place and conditions of detention. In principle, the detention of a 
person as a mental health patient will only be lawful for the purposes of 
sub­paragraph (e) of paragraph 1 if effected in a hospital, clinic or other 
appropriate institution. The Court decided that there has been a breach 
of Article 5 § 1[11].
Applying by comparison the basic principles of the Article 5, para. 
1 (e), established in Winterwerp and further cases, the Court decided that 
the Article 5, para. 1 (e) had been violated in the abovementioned case of 
Enhorn v. Sweden. It said, that «the Article 5 § 1 (e) of the Convention 
refers to several categories of individuals, namely persons spreading 
infectious diseases, persons of unsound mind, alcoholics, drug addicts 
and vagrants. There is a link between all those persons in that they may 
be deprived of their liberty either in order to be given medical treatment 
or because of considerations dictated by social policy, or on both 
medical and social grounds. It is therefore legitimate to conclude from 
this context that a predominant reason why the Convention allows the 
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persons mentioned in paragraph 1 (e) of Article 5 to be deprived of their 
liberty is not only that they are a danger to public safety but also that 
their own interests may necessitate their detention... Taking the above 
principles into account, the Court finds that the essential criteria when 
assessing the lawfulness of the detention of a person for the prevention 
of the spreading of infectious diseases are whether the spreading of 
infectious disease is dangerous to public health or safety, and whether 
detention of the person infected is the last resort in order to prevent the 
spreading of disease, because less severe measures have been considered 
and found to be insufficient to safeguard the public interest. When these 
criteria are no longer fulfilled, the basis for the deprivation of liberty 
ceases to exist [12]. 
The Court, however, decided, that «it is undisputed that the first 
criterion was fulfilled, in that the hIV virus was and is dangerous to 
public health and safety… It thus remains to be examined whether the 
applicant’s detention could be said to be the last resort in order to prevent 
the spreading of the virus, because less severe measures had been 
considered and found to be insufficient to safeguard the public interest». 
Referring to the government’s position, the Court stated that «the 
government have not provided any examples of less severe measures 
which might have been considered for the applicant in the period 
from 16 february 1995 until 12 December 2001, but were apparently 
found to be insufficient to safeguard the public interest» and decided that 
«in these circumstances, the Court finds that the compulsory isolation of 
the applicant was not a last resort in order to prevent him from spreading 
the hIV virus because less severe measures had not been considered and 
found to be insufficient to safeguard the public interest. Moreover, the 
Court considers that by extending over a period of almost seven years 
the order for the applicant’s compulsory isolation, with the result that 
he was placed involuntarily in a hospital for almost one and a half years 
in total, the authorities failed to strike a fair balance between the need 
to ensure that the hIV virus did not spread and the applicant’s right to 
liberty» [13].
As stated in the Chapter 2 of the International Council on human 
Rights Policy Report of 2012 on Sexual health and human Rights in the 
European Region this case has obvious connections to health and rights. 
first, it concerns basic rights such as liberty and self­determination 
when the state takes restrictive measures against an individual whose 
mere liberty is judged to be a danger to public health: «It also highlights 
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how the applicant’s sexuality as such was seen as dangerous by the 
Swedish state. The authorities had concluded that only detention could 
possibly prevent this man from engaging in reckless sexual behavior 
and thereby spread the infection, even though very few facts about his 
past behavior pointed in this direction. In relation to criminalization of 
hIV transmission, this case is relevant in that the Court emphasized that 
Swedish authorities had not complied with its international human rights 
obligations in its combat against the virus – as strongly urged by the 
UNAIDS (above). The use of criminal law or, here, administrative law 
with coercive elements, shall be used as a last resort in measures fighting 
hIV. here, coercive measures had been taken that were not deemed 
to be the last resort available to the authorities. The Court’s decision 
illustrates that states cannot exclude individuals from rights protection 
even though they carry the hIV virus; a holding of equal significance for 
issues of criminalization of hIV transmission» [14].
The decision of the Court in Enhorn v. Sweden was based on the 
compliance with the case­law standards on the Article 5, para. 1 (e). 
however, the fact that the issue of hIV­infected persons’ compulsory 
confinement was only once raised at the level of the European Court 
of human Rights might not only prove the general satisfactory 
obedience of the hIV European guidelines by the States, but also by 
the lack of possible applicants’ access to the Court. In the situation 
when no relevant case­law exists, an analogical application by the Court 
of the law, established in the cases concerning compulsory mental 
treatment, to the cases of prevention of infectious disease spreading 
has to be thoroughly considered. The main reason of the need for a 
careful application by comparison of the case­law standards is that the 
compulsory psychiatric treatment usually accompanies one’s state of 
being not responsible, including criminally, for his/her actions; while an 
intentional spreading of hIV, in particular, constitutes a crime under the 
majority of European domestic criminal legal systems. Understanding 
that certain cases of detention to prevent spreading of infectious diseases 
may fall under the general European quarantine policies, allegations 
of intentional or negligent infection with the lethal disease of another 
person may constitute an opposite legal situation in comparison with 
compulsory mental treatment instead of criminal punishment. having a 
different legal nature, and appropriately sharing the standards of ’lawful 
detention’, both situations need more extensive interpretation for the 
relevant EChR case­law to be properly applied.
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